The Valdosta Times, Nov 11, 1905 Page 7

THE DECISION IN RAWLINGS CASE

A Synopsis of the Points Decided by the Supreme Court in Atlanta

Wednesday— An Exhaustive and Unanimous Decision.

The Times gives below a synopsis of the decision of the supreme court on all of the points involved in the case of J.G. Rawlings and his sons, and Frank Turner.
It will be seen from this that the opinion expressed in our issue yesterday to the effect that Frank Turner’s case was reversed on account of an error in the indictment was not true, but it was on account of insufficient evidence in the case.

The case against Turner will be tried again at the next term of the superior court week after next. Attorney John R. Cooper, of Macon, who represented the defendants, has stated he would carry the case to the United States Supreme Court in the event the decision was against his clients. He will base his appeal to that court on the Fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, dealing with due process of law.

Mr. Cooper holds that this amendment was violated in the refusal of the jury commissioners to put the names of lawyers, doctors and other professional men in the jury box, and that this worked an injustice to his clients.

It is not unlikely that by this means and through appeals to the Prison Commission, and on other ways the execution of the sentences will be delayed for some time to come. The following are the decisions in the case on all of the counts:

Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 58, 59, 60, 61—Criminal docket, J.G. Rawlings, Jesse Rawlings, Milton Rawlings and Leonard Rawlings vs. the state. Frank Turner vs. the state. Indictments for murder, from Lowndes superior court.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Presiding Justice Cobb and a synopsis of the points decided is as follows:

1. The board of jury commissioners may in the exercise of their discretion, omit from the jury list of the county all persons who are exempted by law from jury service, as well as those whose business or avocation is such that it is reasonably probable that an excuse from jury service would be granted by the judge.
2. In the determination of whether the venue of a criminal case shall be changed for the reason that the condition of the public mind is such that the accused can not obtain a fair trial by an impartial jury, the law imposes upon the trial judge the responsibility of making an examination and informing himself of the truth of the averments upon which the application is made; and the supreme court has no power to control his discretion in such a matter, unless it has been plainly and manifestly abused. The record does not disclose any such abuse of discretion in the present case.
3. Principals and accessories before the fact may be charged in the same indictment and in one count.
4. An indictment which charges that one, being absent at the time when the crime was committed, did “procure, counsel, and command” the persons alleged as principals in the crime to commit the same, contains a sufficient charge against one indicted as an accessory before the fact.
5. The internet subject to any of the object: …’crth in any of the demurrer.
6. When a motion for continuance is made upon the absence of witnesses, the court postpones the case until the following day and notifies counsel that officers will be furnished to bring the absent witnesses into court. If such officers are furnished, and all desired witnesses are brought into court, but there is no further motion for a continuance, a ground for a motion for a new trial, complaining of the refusal to continue the case on the day it was first called, is without merit.
7. The failure of the court to interpose of its own motion in case of disorder by the spectators at the trial will not generally be sufficient reason to reverse the judgment when no ruling in reference to the disorder was invoked from the court.
8. That the accused, who was jointly indicted with others, was jointly arraigned with the others after electing to sever upon the trial furnishes no reason for granting a new trial after a separate trial has been accorded to him.
9. The action of the sheriff in making a statement to the judge in the presence of the jury, that the mother of the accused had requested her satchel to be brought into court, and that the satchel contained a pistol, was reprehensible in the manner it was communicated. However, as the counsel for the accused stated that the pistol was solely carried for protection while traveling and was not intended for any improper purpose—and as evidence to this effect was introduced, admitted by the solicitor-general, and the jury was instructed to disregard the incident—refusal to declare a mistrial was properly overruled.
10. The fact that a confession is brought about by improper and unlawful methods from one alleged to be involved in the crime does not prevent such a person from testifying as a witness in the trial of associates in the criminal enterprise. While the circumstances surrounding the confession may discredit the witness, the witness remains competent.
11. In the trial of a murder case, evidence suggesting bad feelings between the father of the accused and the father of the deceased is admissible. This evidence may be considered by the jury in determining whether the accused had a motive to join a party of assassins to slay the deceased’s father and family members, even if the father escaped assassination and only two of his children were killed.
12. In a murder trial involving conspiracy, the acts, conduct, and sayings of conspirators during the conspiracy and before the crime are admissible. Likewise, the actions of conspirators after the crime, if planned as part of the conspiracy, are admissible as evidence.
13. Errors in admitting evidence during a trial may be corrected by the judge withdrawing the evidence from jury consideration and issuing proper instructions. Similarly, errors in the judge’s charge may be corrected by issuing the correct rule to the jury.
14. A challenge to the array is not the proper method for questioning the disqualification of individual jurors.
15. When two defendants are tried jointly for a capital offense and neither exhausts their peremptory challenges, the state is entitled to one-half of the total number of challenges allowed to both.
16. A partially correct charge is not erroneous merely because it fails to include an instruction appropriate to a related proposition.
17. When counsel makes improper remarks, the injured party must ask for an appropriate instruction or mistrial. If only an instruction is requested and granted, a subsequent motion for mistrial on the same grounds should not generally be entertained.
18. When a motion is made to continue a criminal case due to the accused’s physical inability to stand trial, the trial judge’s discretion in overruling the motion, based on conflicting testimony, will not be controlled.
19. A motion for continuance due to counsel’s illness is addressed to the trial judge’s discretion. If the counsel is present and appears capable of continuing, the judge may take this into account. This court will also review how counsel conducted the case to determine whether the refusal to grant a continuance was an abuse of discretion.
20. In the trial of an accessory, the state must prove the guilt of the principal beyond reasonable doubt. Generally, evidence admissible in the trial of the principal is also admissible in the trial of the accessory.
21. In a trial of an accessory to murder, evidence that the accused made threats or offered money to kill the father of the victims is admissible.
22. It is lawful to receive a verdict in a criminal case on Sunday.
23. The evidence against those charged as principals was sufficient to authorize the verdict.
24. The evidence against the accused charged as an accessory before the fact, who was the father of three of the principals, was sufficient to authorize the verdict.
25. The evidence against the other accused charged as an accessory before the fact was insufficient, and the court erred in not granting him a new trial.